The Doctrine of Accommodation in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses by Adams, Arlin M. & Gordon, Sarah Barringer
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 37 
Issue 3 Spring 1988: Symposium Article 2 
The Doctrine of Accommodation in the Jurisprudence of the 
Religion Clauses 
Arlin M. Adams 
Sarah Barringer Gordon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Arlin M. Adams & Sarah B. Gordon, The Doctrine of Accommodation in the Jurisprudence of the Religion 
Clauses, 37 DePaul L. Rev. 317 (1988) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol37/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
THE DOCTRINE OF ACCOMMODATION IN THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
Arlin M. Adams and Sarah Barringer Gordon*
INTRODUCTION
The religion clauses of the first amendment read: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."' Ratified in 1791, the clauses were presumed to be a cohesive and
harmonious protection of religious liberty.' For almost a century after the
clauses were appended to the Constitution, they excited relatively little
controversy.' In the twentieth century, however, there has been an explosion
of litigation challenging various state actions as violating the establishment
clause, the free exercise clause, or both.
This growth in religion clause litigation has resulted in a corresponding
expansion in establishment and free exercise jurisprudence.4 The complexities
* Arlin M. Adams-Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 1969-
87; J.D., University of Pennsylvania 1947; M.A., Temple University 1950; B.S. Temple Uni-
versity 1941. Sarah Barringer Gordon-Associate, Fine, Kaplan and Black, Philadelphia, Pa;
Law Clerk to Judge Adams 1986-87; M.A.R. (Ethics), Yale Divinity School 1987; J.D., Yale
Law School 1986; B.A., Vassar College 1982.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. The religion clauses were supported by a union of both rationalists and pietists.
Rationalists, such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, sought protection for government
from what they claimed were the corrupting and largely irrational influences of religion. Pietists,
on the other hand, wished to shield their religious communities from the depredations of
government. Each group believed that the religion clauses together created a cohesive and
internally consistent system of religious liberty. Mead, American Protestantism During the
Revolutionary Epoch, in RELIGION IN AMERICAN HISTORY: INTERPRETIVE ESSAYS 165-66 (J.
Mulder & J. Wilson eds. 1978). See also M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 5-15
(1965) (Supreme Court has misinterpreted religion clauses by disregarding theological roots of
American principles of separation); L. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-2 to -3, at
1154-66 (1988) (providing in-depth anaylysis as well as history of religion clauses); infra notes
20-22, and 95.
3. Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845) is the only
major case involving the religion clauses prior to the Mormon polygamy cases of the late 1870's
and 1880's. Permoli involved a city ordinance prohibiting transportation of corpses to any
Catholic church for the celebration of funerals. The Court applied the rule of Barron v. The
Mayor & City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), which held that the free exercise clause
did not apply to state governments, and concluded that the city ordinance did not violate the
free exercise clause, because the clause was directed exclusively at federal actions.
4. Compilation of a two-volume casebook by Hon. Arlin M. Adams and Charles Emmerich,
former Director of the Center for Church State Studies at DePaul University, funded in part
by the University of Pennsylvaftia and to be published by the University of Pennsylvania Press,
is currently in the final stages prior to publication. The casebook is expected to be published
sometime in 1989.
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and inconsistencies of the law relating to the clauses prompted Chief Justice
Rehnquist to lament recently that they have become a kind of Scylla and
Charybdis,5 evoking images of Ulysses' perilous journey through the Straits
of Messina. This image suggests that if the monster of establishment clause
doctrine does not trap the unwary sailor, the whirlpool of free exercise will.
In comparing the jurisprudence of the clauses to Scylla and Charybdis,
the Chief Justice criticizes much of the Supreme Court's doctrine, which has
given a broad reading to both the establishment and the free exercise clauses.6
He maintains that each clause should be given a more narrow interpretation,
so that neither will overwhelm the navigator. 7 It would perhaps be more
appropriate to draw an analogy between the establishment and free exercise
clauses and twin beacons, designed to protect and preserve both government
and religion. These protections should not be mutually exclusive, and should
allow for neutral territory between the two poles. Sailors should be able to
plot a safe passage between the twin points of establishment and free exercise.
It is the width and depth of this passage that we address here. Commonly
known as the "permissible zone of accommodation" of religion, the space
between the clauses allows government voluntarily to accommodate the
religious beliefs of citizens. An accommodation, therefore, respects the
religious pluralism of the American people, without undermining the concept
of anti-establishment. The zone between the two clauses has been the subject
of considerable commentary and controversy.' This article is one more
attempt to enter this formidable area.
I. THE CONCEPT OF PERMISSIBLE ACCOMMODATION
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a permissible "zone of
accommodation" exists in the gray area between governmental actions that
5. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("By
broadly construing both Clauses, the Court has constantly narrowed the channel . . . through
which any state or federal action must pass in order to survive constitutional scrutiny.").
6. Included in the critique are free exercise cases such as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963), and Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), both of which mandated state
unemployment benefits for religious individuals who refused to work at certain times or on
certain products because of their faith. On the establishment side, reference is made to cases
involving aid to parochial schools, such as Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1973), and
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). The charge is
that these cases were decided incorrectly on the basis of an "overly expansive" interpretation
of the establishment clause. 450 U.S. at 721-25.
7. 450 U.S. at 726-27.
8. Included among the many works that deal with accommodation doctrine are Choper,
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITr. L. REv.
673 (1980); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part
L The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1381 (1967); Kurland, Of Church and
State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm L. REv. 1 (1961); McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 1; Oaks, Separation, Accommodation and the Future of Church
and State, 35 DE PAUL L. REv. 1 (1985); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment
Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968); L. TRIaE, supra note 2, § 14-4, at 1166; Note, Permissible
Accommodations of Religion: Reconsidering the New York Get Statute, 96 YALE L.J. 1147
(1987) [hereinafter Note, New York Get Statute].
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violate the establishment clause and individual religious rights protected by
the free exercise clause. In Zorach v. Clauson,9 written by Justice Douglas
in 1952, the Supreme Court upheld a released-time program that permitted
public school children to be dismissed from class in order to receive religious
instruction at parochial schools and churches. The Court reasoned that the
arrangement did not violate the establishment clause, because it accommo-
dated rather than advanced religious interests. 10 Actions that fall within the
zone of permissible accommodation adjust governmental regulations to the
religious needs of citizens, Justice Douglas reasoned, without transgressing
the prohibitions of the establishment clause.
"Permissible accommodation" may thus be defined as an area of allowable
governmental deference to the religious requirements of a pluralistic society
in which a variety of religious beliefs are deeply held. This kind of voluntary
accommodation should not be confused with the judicial or scholarly refer-
ences to accommodation required by the free exercise clause. When Chief
Justice Burger spoke in Lynch v. Donnelly" of the affirmative mandate to
accommodate imposed on government by the free exercise guarantee, 12 he
was not discussing permissible accommodation but rather mandatory accom-
modation. The former Chief Justice was referring to the principle that if a
free exercise right is determined to have been infringed, government must
accommodate the right, unless a compelling and narrowly tailored state
interest justifies the infringement. This kind of court-ordered accommodation
is an implementation of the free exercise clause and should not be equated
with the voluntary accommodation to which this article is addressed.
Also distinguishable from the permissible accommodation analyzed in this
article is governmental action that violates the establishment clause, often
referred to as "forbidden" or "impermissible" accommodation. 3 Forbidden
accommodation is in fact a term describing governmental action that has
gone beyond the bounds of allowable deference to religious expression and
belief, to actual endorsement of a particular religion. Forbidden accommo-
dation is a wolf in sheep's clothing, as it were, since it is a term used to
describe an establishment masquerading as an accommodation. Thus, im-
permissible accommodation is something of a contradiction in terms, because
it infringes on the citizenry's right to a government that adheres to the non-
establishment principle.
9. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
10. Id. at 314-15.
11. 465 U.S. 668 (1984), reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984).
12. 465 U.S. at 673.
13. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985) (statute that
singled out Sabbath observers for accommodation violated establishment clause); Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (courts must draw
line between "permissible and impermissible" accommodations to accord with history and
reflect understanding of Founding Fathers).
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The Zorach decision was immediately controversial, especially because
four years earlier the Court had struck down a similar program.14 But the
more enduring controversy arising from Zorach has been over the meaning
and wisdom of the newly-discovered accommodation doctrine. In the period
since Zorach, judges and commentators have proposed various theories for
defining and applying the doctrine of accommodation.
For most of its history, the accommodation theory has been a favorite of
moderates. In using the term moderates, we mean those who believe that,
while religion plays a vital role in American life and should not be burdened
by excessive governmental intrusion, the establishment clause must be en-
forced vigilantly to protect both religious and political liberties. Recently,
however, some commentators have argued that the doctrine should be ex-
panded beyond its traditionally narrow scope. 5 According to such arguments,
almost any governmental action taken to accommodate religious interests
would pass muster under the establishment clause. As at least one scholar
acknowledges, accommodation in this light would mean a weakening of both
religion clauses.' 6 Such an approach, we would argue, might increase the
accommodation of mainstream religions, but could compromise the rights
of minority religions and add dramatically to the government's involvement
in religious affairs.
We believe that neither the history of the religion clauses nor the case law
that has developed around these clauses supports this position. When prop-
14. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), the Court
invalidated an Illinois school district's policy of allowing religious instructors to conduct classes
during the school day on public school grounds. Although the school district did not pay the
teachers, Justice Black, writing for a majority that included Justice Douglas, stated that:
[Niot only are the State's tax-supported public school buildings used for the
dissemination of religious doctrines. The State also affords sectarian groups an
invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through
use of the State's compulsory public school machinery. This is not separation of
Church and State.
Id. at 212.
Justices Black, Jackson and Frankfurter, dissenting separately in Zorach, argued that there
was no meaningful distinction between the programs involved in the two cases. Justice Jackson
was especially outraged by the seeming contradictions between McCollum and Zorach. He
stated:
The distinction attempted between [McCollum] and this [case] is trivial, almost to
the point of cynicism, magnifying its nonessential details and disparaging compulsion
which was the underlying reason for invalidity. A reading of the Court's opinion
in that case along with its opinion in this case will show such difference of overtones
and undertones as to make clear that the McCollum case has passed like a storm
in a teacup. The wall which the Court was professing to erect between Church and
State has become even more warped and twisted than I expected. Today's judgment
will be more interesting to students of psychology and of the judicial processes than
to students of constitutional law.
343 U.S. at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
15. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
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erly applied, the accommodation doctrine is a helpful analytical tool that
resolves much of the tension between the two clauses. By steering a middle
course between overly strict application of either the establishment or the
free exercise clause, accommodation theory plays an essential role in the
continued vitality of both. The concept of accommodation must itself be
circumscribed carefully, however, or it will lose the quality of moderation
that is its strength.
Accommodation, therefore, demands a careful balance between anti-es-
tablishment and free exercise principles. To allow accommodation to under-
mine the notion of separation of church and state would be to abandon a
fundamental aspect of the non-establishment mandate. At the other extreme,
voluntary accommodation by government generally focuses only on the most
populous and visible religious groups. Religious minorities that currently are
protected by the free exercise clause most likely would be overlooked if their
rights were entrusted to the legislatures of state or federal governments. If
accommodation is allowed to expand into the area protected by the free
exercise clause, the rights of small minority groups will be prey to the
"tyranny of the majority." Pushed to either extreme, accommodation would
undermine core principles of the religion clauses.
To avoid the dangers of an overly expansive definition of accommodation,
we propose that accommodation be limited to those situations in which the
danger of establishment is remote. Further, like the free exercise mandate,
the accommodation doctrine should be applied where there is a need to
relieve a burden on religious conduct which is imposed by government. But
accommodation must not be confused with free exercise; not all burdens on
religion entitle a religious believer to constitutionally compelled relief. Ac-
commodation should be reserved for religious practices that do not mandate
free exercise relief. When a compelling state interest justifies a burden on
religious exercise, or where the infringement is so incidental and remote that
an exemption is outweighed by the need for uniformity, accommodation is
appropriate.
In analyzing a challenged governmental action, a court should determine
first whether the action removes a burden on religion that has been imposed
by government rather than by social, economic, or other non-governmental
forces. If so, the accommodation does not violate the establishment clause.
Second, a court should determine whether the governmentally-imposed bur-
den would entitle the plaintiff to relief under the free exercise clause. If so,
the removal of the burden is in reality an interpretation of the scope and
requirements of the free exercise clause, rather than a truly voluntary ac-
commodation. By contrast, if the burden does not rise to the level of a
violation of free exercise rights, then the removal of the burden is a genuine
accommodation.
Our proposed test, then, involves the identification of two basic compo-
nents:
(1) a governmentally-imposed burden on religious exercise, which
(2) does not entitle the believer to constitutionally-compelled relief.
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This test preserves intact the non-establishment and free exercise guarantees,
and provides for a significant area of governmental accommodation of
religion. Although no single standard can anticipate the many potential
situations that arise in the course of constitutional litigation, we are persuaded
that this proposal strikes a useful balance between the two clauses.
II. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RELIGION
CLAUSES
As drafted in 1791, both the establishment and free exercise clauses were
designed to have a narrow scope. The dramatic expansion of the federal
government, and the application of the religion clauses to the states through
incorporation by the fourteenth amendment, have combined to extend the
reach of the clauses into areas not contemplated by the Drafters or by the
ratifying states.
A. The Original Application of the Religion Clauses17
Recent scholarship has disclosed that the congressional debates on the
wording of the religion clauses were not directed toward complete separation
of religion and government. Rather, the clauses were designed to limit the
power of the federal government (rather than the state governments) to
declare a particular faith the official religion of the United States. The
Framers wanted to insure that government would not enforce the dogma of
an officially-endorsed religion, thereby encroaching on the freedom of dis-
senters to hold and practice their own beliefs."8 This intent is illustrated by
a proposed amendment submitted by James Madison, which read: "The civil
rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship,
nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal
rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed."' 19
17. Jefferson Powell, in a brilliant examination of the validity of using the "original intent"
of the Framers as a guide to constitutional interpretation, stated that the intent of the Framers
"was that the Constitution, like any other legal document, would be interpreted in accord with
its express language." Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HAv. L.
REV. 885, 903 (1985). In this light, the meaning of the words used in the document, rather
than the content of debates surrounding adoption of a particular provision, would be the
primary guide to constitutional interpretation, together with "the usual judicial process of case-
by-case interpretation." Id. at 904.
Professor Powell's historical investigation calls into question the view that constitutional cases
should be decided by reference to the "original intent" of the Framers. According to Powell,
the use of "original intent" to decide cases involving constitutional provisions may violate to
some extent the very intent at the drafting of the Constitution.
18. The pathbreaking legal history of Mark DeWolfe Howe revealed that the protection of
religious organizations from governmentally-imposed orthodoxy, as well as the protection of
government from the encroachments of established religion, were prime factors in the move to
draft and enact the religion clauses. M. HOWE, supra note 2, at 1-32. See also infra note 95.
19. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 94 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing I ANNALS
OF CONGRESS at 434).
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Madison explained the meaning of the proposal as providing "that Congress
should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by
law." ' 20 State representatives did not wish to "abolish religion altogether,"




The wording eventually adopted makes clear the exclusively federal appli-
cation of the religion clauses. "Congress" alone is prohibited from estab-
lishing a religion and interfering with the free exercise of religion. The history
of state-established religions, not addressed in the amendment, as well as
the plain language of the amendment, make it apparent that the constraints
imposed by the clauses applied only to the federal government. State actions
were in no way affected by the first amendment.
Religious establishments in the states were common until the early nine-
teenth century. Massachusetts, Connecticut and Maryland, to name but three
of the original thirteen states, legislated varying degrees of governmental
support for particular religious denominations. 2  South Carolina established
"the Christian Protestant religion," without preferring one denomination
over another." Significantly, in a few cases these state establishments con-
tinued well into the nineteenth century. For example, Massachusetts' estab-
lishment of the Congregational Church endured until 1833.24
20. Id. at 95 (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 730).
21. Id. (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS at 729).
22. As adopted in 1780, Article III of the Massachusetts Constitution provided:
As the happiness of a people and the good order and preservation of civil government
essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality ..the legislature shall ...
require, the several towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies-politic or religious
societies to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the institution of the
public worship of God and for the support and maintenance of Protestant teachers
of piety, religion, and morality, in all cases where such provision shall not be made
voluntarily.
5 W. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONS 93 (1975) [hereinafter
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS].
Connecticut, which delayed adopting a formal constitution well into the nineteenth century,
preferred instead to retain its 1662 charter, which provided for a religious as well as civil
government of the colony. 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS at 134. The Constitution of 1818, the
first formal state constitution, disestablished the Congregational Church, providing that "No
preference shall be given by law to any Christian sect or mode of worship." Art. I, § 4,
reprinted in id. at 145.
Article 33 of the Maryland Constitution of 1776 provided that "the Legislature may, in their
discretion, lay a general and equal tax, for the support of the Christian religion .. " 4 SOURCES
AND DOCUMENTS at 374. The Constitution was amended in 1810 by Article 13, which stated
that "it shall not be lawful for the general assembly of this State to lay an equal and general
tax, or any other tax, on the people of this State, for the support of any religion." Id. at 387.
23. Article 38 of the South Carolina Constitution of 1778 provided: "The Christian Prot-
estant religion shall be deemed, and is hereby constituted and declared to be, the established
religion of this State." 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS at 474. This article was repealed implicitly
by Article 8 of the 1790 Constitution, which declared that free exercise would be protected
"without discrimination or preference." Id. at 480.
24. The disestablishment movement in Massachusetts was led, surprisingly enough, by
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 37:317
The desire of the states that ratified the Constitution was not that all
government be separated forcibly from all religion, but that the federal
government be expressly confined in the exercise of its power. Although
Madison and several other Framers argued that the Constitution created a
federal government of such limited powers that no additional protection for
religious liberty was necessary, by 1789 five of the eleven colonies that had
ratified the Constitution insisted that explicit protection for civil liberties
should be appended to the original text. 25 Indeed, Rhode Island and North
Carolina conditioned their ratification on the inclusion of a Bill of Rights. 26
conservative members of the established Congregational Church. By the early nineteenth century,
notions of original sin and predestination, so central to pre-Revolutionary Congregationalism,
seemed backward-looking to educated mercantile Bostonians. These prosperous city-dwellers
were attracted by the Enlightenment emphasis on natural morality and reason, and rejected the
harsh theology of earlier religious leaders. The liberals of eastern Massachusetts, seeking to
escape the strictures of orthodoxy, evolved a Unitarian theology, based on orderly "self-evident
truths" of the Trinity. See generally S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 390-94 (1972) (providing historical survey of emergence of Unitarian liberalism).
The split between this liberal faction and the adherents of orthodoxy became open and bitter
soon after the turn of the century. By 1820, the schism was final-Harvard was openly Unitarian,
and conservatives in Dedham were outraged when the majority of the parish called a liberal
Unitarian their minister. In the resulting lawsuit, Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488 (1830), the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that Article III of the 1780 state constitution, which
taxed all landowners not members of any other church to support the Congregational Church,
entitled all taxpayers who contributed to the support of the parish to vote in the election of
the minister. Chief Justice Parker, himself a Unitarian, wrote for the court, stating that the
decision was not one of theology, but rather of property rights, since those taxed were thereby
privileged to vote. 16 Mass. at 502-03. See generally M. HowE, supra note 2 at 12-32.
Angry conservatives quickly joined with Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, and other relig-
ious minorities in calling for disestablishment. Article III was amended in 1833 to recognize
simply that "the public worship of God, and instructions in piety, religion, and morality,
promote the happiness and prosperity of a people, and the security of a republican government."
5 SOURCES & DOCUMENTS at 113.
25. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 93 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing 3 J. ELLIOTT,
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 659 (1891)). In his dissent in Wallace, Justice Rehnquist
argues that James Madison, rather than Thomas Jefferson, may be a more appropriate source
for understanding of the Framers' perspective, since Jefferson in fact was out of the country
when the Bill of Rights was passed by Congress. Id. at 92. He discusses the history of the
enactment of the religion clauses in some detail, concluding that the Framers never intended
to ban school prayer, or to be neutral between religion and non-religion.
The Court strikes down the Alabama statute because the State wished to 'char-
acterize prayer as a favored practice.' It would come as much of a shock to those
who drafted the Bill of Rights as it will to a large number of thoughtful Americans
today to learn that the Constitution, as construed by the majority, prohibits the
Alabama Legislature from 'endorsing' prayer. George Washington himself, at the
request of the very Congress which passed the Bill of Rights, proclaimed a day of
'public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful
hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God.' History must judge whether
it was the Father of his Country in 1789, or a majority of the Court today, which
has strayed from the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
26. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing I J. ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 334 (1891)).
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Memories of religious persecution in the "Old World," as well as the
widespread resentment provoked before the Revolution by England's attempt
to send an Anglican bishop to the colonies, lingered in the minds of state
legislators. The concerns of the states did not result in a prohibition of
establishment at home, however, although several states did take steps to
protect the rights of religious dissenters. 27 Thus, a primary fear of many
state leaders was that the federal government would interfere with state
establishments, and perhaps even impose a national religion on the individual
states. 2
Moreover, as the Supreme Court recognized recently in Marsh v. Cham-
bers,29 a case involving the constitutionality of state legislative chaplains, the
adoption of the religion clauses did not prompt the Framers to abandon all
manner of religious observance. Indeed, the First Congress elected a chaplain
to open each legislative session with a prayer, and "the practice of opening
sessions with prayer has continued without interruption ever since." 30 The
actions of the First Congress reveal that it believed it was bound to protect
only against a "real threat" of religious establishment or infringement of
religious liberty." The arguably remote possibility of an eventual establish-
ment resulting from the employment of legislative chaplains apparently did
not present the potential for establishment that the Framers sought to prohibit
in the religion clauses.3 2
27. See, e.g. PA. CONST. of 1790, Art. IX, § 3 (1790):
[AIll men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according
to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can of right be compelled to
attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against
his consent; that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere
with the rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given, by law,
to any religious establishments or modes of worship.
8 SouRcEs & DoCUMENTS, supra note 21, at 292.
28. This understanding of the applicability of the religion clauses solely as a restraint on
federal government was unquestioned throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As
Chief Justice Marshall explained in 1833:
The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States
for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the
individual states. Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in that
constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular
government as its judgment dictated.
Barron v. The Mayor and City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). See also Permoli
v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845) (applying doctrine of
Barron to free exercise claim challenging city ordinance); see supra note 3.
29. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
30. Id. at 788.
31. Id. at 791.
32. The danger posed by a legislative chaplaincy, as Justice Stevens noted in this dissent in
Marsh, is that chaplains of mainstream denominations dominate legislative prayer sessions.
Prayers may be said by a Catholic priest in the Massachusetts Legislature and by
a Presbyterian minister in the Nebraska Legislature, but I would not expect to find
a Jehovah's Witness or a disciple of Mary Baker Eddy or the Reverend Moon
serving as the official chaplain in any state legislature.
463 U.S. at 823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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B. The Expansion of the Religion Clauses
It may seem astonishing that the clauses now have such a wide application,
given the popular understanding at the time of adoption that the religion
clauses applied only to the federal government, and the understanding of
the Drafters that all religious observance was not prohibited by the clauses.
Today, the free exercise clause protects schoolchildren from mandatory flag
salutes in state-run schools,33 and it prohibits states from requiring oaths of
office that include references to God.34 The establishment clause now pro-
hibits state-sponsored school prayers or Bible reading in coercive settings,3"
and the posting of the Ten Commandments on school walls.36
Two major developments in the legal and political landscape explain this
expansion of the religion clauses. First, the activities of government-at both
the state and federal levels-have increased dramatically in the twentieth
century. Second, the "incorporation" of the religion clauses through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment has extended the application of
the religion clauses to the states. As a result of these two developments, an
inherent tension between the two clauses has emerged.
1. Increased Governmental Activity
The rise of the welfare state in the mid-twentieth century has generated
myriad new points of contact between government and individual citizens.
The advent of such programs as Social Security, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children and unemployment insurance all have contributed to
increased governmental interaction with individual lives. Further, compulsory
public education, largely operated by states but encouraged and supported
financially by the federal government, also involves government in vital
aspects of the day-to-day lives of many Americans.37
In an era of state and federal taxes on everything from income to fuel
oil, we often forget that the reach of government into our pocketbooks and
even into our privacy was at one time virtually negligible. For many of us,
the religious significance of photographs on drivers licenses,38 mandated
33. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
34. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
35. Abington School Dist. v. Shempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
36. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981).
37. For analyses of the role of compulsory public education in the development of the
jurisprudence of the religion clauses, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 80-81 (1985) (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring); McConnell, supra note 8, at 8-13.
38. See Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984) (state requirement of photograph
to obtain driver's license violated plaintiff's free exercise rights), aff'd by an equally divided
Court sub nom., Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985).
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employment hours on Saturday, 9 or the payment of Social Security taxes, 4"
may seem minimal. Yet to the adherents of a variety of religious beliefs,
such governmental regulations invade areas of great religious significance.
The free exercise clause, when invoked as a support for exemption from an
otherwise neutral regulation or statute, may provide an exemption from the
impact of an ostensibly neutral statute that would force religious believers
to choose between violating religious beliefs or forfeiting the benefits of
participating in governmentally-sponsored programs.
On the other side of the coin, increased governmental activity also runs
the risk of involving government with religion in a manner that places the
government's imprimatur on certain religious practices. Mandatory prayer
in public schools has long been held a governmental endorsement of certain
religious beliefs or practices. 4' Some constitutional plaintiffs have even argued
that the public schools have been so purged of any vestige of religion that
secular humanism has been enshrined in its place. 42 Although the litigants
making this argument initially were successful in the district courts, appellate
tribunals have rejected their claims.43 Furthermore, the Supreme Court re-
cently rejected a similar "secular humanism" argument in Edwards v. Aquil-
lard." In Aquillard, the Court held that a Louisiana statute known as the
Creationism Act, which forbade the teaching of evolution in public schools
unless accompanied by the teaching of "creation science," violated the
establishment clause. The Court agreed with the lower court's conclusion
that the Act did not protect academic freedom but rather discredited "ev-
olution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching" of
religiously-based theories, 45 thus conveying a message of official endorsement
of a particular religious perspective.
2. Incorporation of the Religion Clauses
Together with the vastly increased potential for conflicts between religious
belief and government, the legal world has witnessed a similar expansion of
39. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment compensation may not be
denied to Seventh-Day Adventist whose religious beliefs prohibit working on Saturday).
40. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Old Order Amish religious beliefs
prohibiting payment or receipt of Social Security taxes outweighed by compelling governmental
interest in uniform administration of Social Security system).
41. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state may not compose official state prayer
and require its recitation in public schools).
42. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987); Smith v.
Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
43. See, e.g., Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 655 F. Supp. 939
(S.D. Ala. 1987) (public school textbooks that omitted reference to significance of religion in
American history violated establishment clause by enshrining religious values of secular hu-
manism), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 647
F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (fundamentalist Christian schoolchildren have free exercise
right to refrain from reading textbooks that violate their religious beliefs), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058
(6th Cir. 1987).
44. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
45. Id. at 2580 (quoting Edwards v. Aquillard, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985)).
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constitutional jurisprudence. For the religion clauses, the watershed was
reached in the mid-twentieth century when the clauses were held to be
"incorporated" into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution require that individual
states guarantee the equal protection of the law and not abridge individual
rights to life, liberty or property without due process of law.46 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the due process clause, which protects "liberty" in
general, as embodying many of the limitations on government contained in
the Bill of Rights. In two separate cases, Cantwell v. Connecticut47 and
Everson v. Board of Education, 48 the Supreme Court held that the free
exercise and establishment clauses apply to the states as well as to the federal
government.
As a result of incorporation, a flood of religion clause litigation ensued,
eventually bringing to light an inherent conflict between the commands of
the two provisions. The conflict is easily explained, although not easily
resolved. Generally, the establishment clause prohibits the government from
favoring one religion over another. If the government grants an exemption
to a believer under the free exercise clause, while requiring all others to obey
the law, the government effectively prefers the religion of that individual
over the religion of those individuals who adhere to other religious beliefs,
apparently in violation of the establishment clause.
The Supreme Court has recognized this tension between the clauses several
times, although thus far it has not set forth a clear resolution of the conflict.4 9
Generally, however, the Court and scholars have suggested that, while the
clauses may be logically at odds if read as absolutely prohibiting preferential
treatment among denominations and infringement of religious exercise, nei-
ther should be given such an absolute reading. As Chief Justice Burger
acknowledged in a landmark case dealing with property tax exemptions for
places used exclusively for religious worship, "[tihe Court has struggled to
find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are
46. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating free exercise clause).
48. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating establishment clause).
49. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981) (acknowledging "tension"
between clauses); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413-17 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("There are many situations where legitimate claims under the Free Exercise Clause will run
into head-on collision with the Court's insensitive and sterile construction of the Establishment
Clause.").
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cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme,
would tend to clash with the other." '50
The apparent conflict between the religion clauses has prompted commen-
tators to propose several possible solutions. Professor Kurland of the Uni-
versity of Chicago articulated a proposed resolution of the emerging conflict
over 20 years ago. He argued that government should be entirely neutral
with regard to religion. According to Kurland, "religion may not be used
as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental action, whether
that action be the conferring of rights or privileges or the imposition of
duties or obligations."'" The neutrality theory, although certainly a means
of resolving the discord, has been criticized as precluding all forms of
religious exemptions. As Professor Giannella pointed out, the increase in the
twentieth century of governmental regulations and social welfare programs
has outmoded Kurland's argument.52 Increased governmental activity inevi-
tably produces the potential for infringement of religious beliefs, and the
neutrality theory would not alleviate the heightened burden borne by believ-
ers .
53
A second well-known approach would employ differing definitions of
religion for each clause. Professor Tribe of Harvard University has contended
that anything "arguably religious" should be protected by the free exercise
clause, and that anything "arguably non-religious" does not violate the
establishment clause.5 4 Admittedly a means of resolving all conflicts in favor
of the free exercise clause, Tribe maintains that such an approach is necessary
in a country committed to religious equality and plurality. 5 However. his
stance has been criticized as repugnant to the plain language of the clauses.
The word "religion" is used only once in the first amendment, prohibiting
the enactment of "laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." '5 6 Superimposing alternate definitions of the same
word for the two clauses would be inconsistent with the language of the
amendment.17
50. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
51 P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 (1962).
52. Giannella, supra note 8, at 1389-90.
53. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82-83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It
is difficult to square any notion of 'complete neutrality' . . . with the mandate of the Free
Exercise Clause that government must sometimes exempt a religious observer from an otherwise
generally applicable obligation. A government that confers a benefit on an explicitly religious
basis is not neutral toward religion."). See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372
(White, J., dissenting) (first amendment itself contains religious classification; therefore, absolute
neutrality is impossible).
54. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 14-6, at 1183.
55. Id. § 14-8, at 1201 (free exercise clause should dominate in cases of conflict).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
57. In Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 211-12 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring), Judge
Adams rejected a dual-definition approach as contrary to both the language and the history of
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Justice O'Connor recently addressed the tension between the clauses. In a
concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, a decision invalidating Alabama's
moment of silence statute, she stated that "[tihe solution to the conflict
between the Religion Clauses lies not in 'neutrality,' but rather in identifying
workable limits to the government's license to promote the free exercise of
religion." 5 8 At least one Supreme Court Justice, therefore, indirectly has
proposed ameliorating much of the tension between the clauses through use
of the accommodation doctrine. It is in the "play in the joints" of the two
clauses, to use the language of Chief Justice Burger in Walz v. Tax Com-
mission,5 9 that the accommodation theory finds its proper place, and that
much of the tension may be eliminated. Before examining the boundaries
of the so-called play-in-the-joints approach, we first review the history of
accommodation.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF ACCOMMODATION THEORY
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court first articulated the permissible
accommodation doctrine in the Zorach v. Clauson6w decision. In Zorach, the
Supreme Court upheld a released-time program for religious instruction of
public schoolchildren, so long as the program was not on school property.
the religion clauses:
Despite the distinguished scholars who advocate [a dual-definition] approach, a
stronger argument can be made for a unitary definition to prevail for both clauses.
This would seem to be the preferable choice for several reasons. First, it is virtually
required by the language of the first amendment .... [Further, a]lthough the
Constitution has often been subject to a broad construction, it remains a written
document. It is difficult to justify a reading of the first amendment so as to support
a dual definition of religion, nor has our attention been drawn to any support for
such a view in the conventional sources that have been thought to reveal the
intention of the Framers.
Id. at 211-12 (Adams, J., concurring).
58. The definition of "state action" encompasses distinct concepts for purposes of the
fourteenth and eleventh amendments. The eleventh amendment has been construed as embodying
the doctrine of sovereign immunity; a state may not be sued without its consent. See Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Court, however, has created a distinction between suits
against a state and suits against a state officer. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, an individual may bring an action against a state
official provided the relief requested is prospective in nature. Id. Thus, an individual bringing
suit in this posture is able to claim "state action" sufficient to invoke the protection of the
fourteenth amendment, but does not trigger the prohibition of the eleventh amendment. See
Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation and Regulation: Separation of
Powers Issues in Controversies about Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV 682, 687 n.26 (1976).
However, a dual-definition of a term in the context of the religion clauses is more problematic.
First, the text of the first amendment uses the term "religion" once, indicating Congress
intended that a unitary definition should apply to both the establishment and free exercise
clauses. See Malnak, 592 F.2d at 211. Second, the two religion clauses were not written a
century apart, as were the fourteenth and eleventh amendments.
59. 397 U.S. at 669.
60. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas explained that invalidation of the
arrangement would place the government in a position of actual hostility to
religion. 61
Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious
instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular
institutions to force one or some religion on any person. But we find no
constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be
hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the
effective scope of religious influence.62
Such a position, the Court held, would be antithetical to the principles of
the Constitution. 63 The Court stressed that government must be neutral in
its treatment of different sects and may not prefer one group over another. 64
At the same time, government must not be hostile to religion. Each religious
group must be allowed to succeed or fail on its own merits, without gov-
ernmental interference. "We sponsor an attitude on the part of government
that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according
to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. ' ' 65 This principle
of voluntarism, however, does not mean that the government must ignore
all manifestations of religious belief. As Zorach implied, respecting the
religious nature of our people and accommodating religious beliefs are
fundamental prerequisites of a pluralistic society.
Compulsion,. according to Zorach, is equally at odds with constitutional
values. Coerced religious exercise would violate basic principles of religious
liberty. Accommodation of the desire to worship or to take religious instruc-
tion differs fundamentally from coercion. In such a situation, the Court
stated, "[the government.] can close its doors or suspend its operations as
to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuary for worship or
instruction." 66 By so doing, government neither endorses nor inhibits religion,
but rather follows what the Court called "our own prepossessions. ' '67
As Justice Black argued in his dissent in Zorach,6s and as a majority of
the Court had stated five years earlier in Everson v. Board of Education,69
the Constitution does not require a complete separation of church and state.
According to the perspective of Zorach, the critical difference between
sponsorship and accommodation is the compulsory or coercive nature of the
government's actions. Accommodation stems from the principle of volun-
tarism and does not implicate even indirect compulsion. In Zorach, public
61. 343 U.S. at 314.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 313.
64. Id. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
65. 343 U.S. at 313.
66. Id. at 314.
67. Id. (citing Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948)).
68. Id. at 318-19 (Black, J., dissenting).
69. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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school grounds were not used for religious instruction, nor were students in
any way required to attend sectarian classes. Thus, although the participating
public schools certainly showed deference to the religious needs of school-
children by releasing them early to go to religious classes, there was no
actual involvement by the school with the instruction itself. The schools were
accommodating rather than promoting religion.
As Justice Jackson suggested in his dissent in Zorach, this distinction
between accommodation and promotion or endorsement may seem meta-
physical at times, yet the distinction is a vital one for constitutional analysis
and furtherance of the individual's religious interests. 70 Without such a
distinction, virtually all governmental actions that take cognizance of the
religious pluralism of the American people would violate the establishment
clause. Pressed to an extreme, this approach also would invalidate all ex-
emptions granted for religious reasons, undermining religious freedom. At
the same time, the precise limits of permissible accommodation were not
defined in Zorach, and the theory remained a minor thread in the fabric of
constitutional analysis until 1970.
In that year, the Supreme Court upheld property tax exemptions for
religious as well as other charitable institutions. The Court, in Walz v. Tax
Commission,7' proclaimed that the granting of tax-exempt status is not
sponsorship since the government does not transfer revenue to churches but
Cimply abstains from demanding that they support the state.72 The Court
stated:
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government
does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from
demanding that the church support the state. No one has ever suggested
that tax exemption has converted libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into
arms of the state or put employees' 'on the public payroll.'17
Moreover, Walz refined the concept of accommodation. Recognizing that
there is a gray area between the two clauses, Walz stated explicitly that
"[tihe limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means
co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the free exercise clause." '7 4
According to Walz, tax exemptions are accommodations that are analytically
similar to the released-time program upheld in Zorach. Because state spon-
sorship of religious institutions is not inherent in a tax exemption, government
may validly decide to refrain from requiring churches to support the state. 75
70. 343 U.S. at 325 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
71. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
72. Id. at 675.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 673.
75. It could be argued that enforced taxation is potentially more problematic than exemption,
since in that case churches in effect would be financing government, thereby entangling
government in religious affairs:
The hazards of churches supporting government are hardly less in their potential
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Walz was the first decision that explicitly distinguished the doctrine of
accommodation from free exercise requirements, stating that accommodation
is not a synonym for free exercise:
Grants of exemption historically reflect the concern of authors of consti-
tutions and statutes as to the latent dangers inherent in the imposition of
property taxes; exemption constitutes a reasonable and balanced attempt
to guard against those dangers. The limits of permissible state accommo-
dation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. To equate the two would be to
deny a national heritage with roots in the Revolution itself.76
Instead, according to Walz, accommodation exists in the "play" between
the two religion clauses. 77 Voluntary accommodations of religion-actions
that fall between acts prohibited by the establishment clause and acts required
by the free exercise clause-are a kind of "benevolent neutrality. ' 78
Ironically, Justice Douglas, the author of Zorach, dissented in Walz. 79
Rather than viewing tax exemptions for religious organizations as a form of
governmental abstention, Douglas characterized them as a subsidy forbidden
by the non-establishment guarantee. Conceding that the dividing line between
accommodation and sponsorship may not always be clear, Douglas none-
theless declared that Walz was a clear case, since "in common understanding
one of the best ways to 'establish' one or more religions is to subsidize
them, which a tax exemption does." 80
The Supreme Court hinted in a conscientious objector case in the early
1970's that religious exemptions from military service may be another ex-
ample of a permissible accommodation.8" However, the next major case to
deal with the concept of accommodation involved Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act and the requirement that employers make "reasonable accom-
modations" to employees' religious needs.8 2 In Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison,3 Justice White's majority opinion held that an employer was not
required by the statute to incur more than a de minimis cost to satisfy the
than the hazards of government supporting churches; each relationship carries some
involvement rather than the desired insulation and separation. We cannot ignore
the instances in history when church support of government led to the kind of
involvement we seek to avoid.
Id. at 675 (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 673.
77. Id. at 669.
78. Id.
79. 397 U.S. at 700 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 701.
81. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 n.23 (1971) (noting that conscientous objector
status is not mandated by the free exercise clause).
82. Under Title VII, a private employer may not discriminate on the basis of an employee's
religion, "unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship
on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982).
83. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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reasonable accommodation requirement. Strictly speaking, Hardison was not
a constitutional case, given that the challenge was based on the statutory
language of Title VII rather than on constitutional accommodation theory.
The decision suggests, however, that accommodation may not necessarily
result in preferential treatment for an employee whose religion forbids work
on Saturdays.8 4 Such an arrangement, Justice White stated, would exceed
the bounds of reasonableness, because, in that case, it would impose an
undue burden on a private employer. Implicit in the Hardison holding is the
notion that, to pass constitutional scrutiny, any statutory accommodation
of religion must involve no more than minimal cost for the private accom-
modator.
Recently, several Supreme Court cases have further refined the notion of
reasonable accommodation of an employee's sabbatarian practices. In Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 5 the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute
that required all employers to allow employees to arrange their work week
in a way that would not conflict with sabbatarian religious beliefs. In an
eight-to-one opinion, the Court held that this requirement was a violation
of the establishment clause. Far from being a reasonable accommodation,
the blanket right to be excused from work, without regard to the hardship
suffered by the employers or other employees, was a state-imposed burden
on private employers to support religious worship.a6
In Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook,a7 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, upheld an employer's policy that paid personal leave
for religious observance be limited to three days per year. Because the Court
determined that it was "reasonable" to structure the leave system to provide
a maximum of three paid religious holidays, the majority held that it need
not inquire whether another leave policy that may have accommodated the
plaintiff's religious beliefs to a greater extent, might also have been reason-
able. "By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable accommo-
dation by the employer is sufficient to meet an accommodation obligation....
The employer need not further show that each of the employee's [proposed]
alternative accommodations would result in undue hardship.""s
84. Id. at 84.
85. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
86. Id. at 710 ("[U]nyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests
contravenes a fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses," by requiring employers and
fellow employees to support observance of Sabbatarians.).
87. 107 S. Ct. 367 (1986).
88. 107 S. Ct. at 372. Justice Marshall suggested in his dissent that the employer has a duty
to consider an employee's proposal for accomodation where the confict is not "completely
resolved" by the employer's solution. He stated that in Philbrook the conflict had not been
fully resolved because the employee was forced to choose between following his religious
precepts and losing wages, or violating those precepts in order to receive full pay. Justice
Marshall stated that the employer had a duty under Title VII to consider further alternative
proposals for accommodation if these steps could be taken without undue hardship. Id. at 374-
75.
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Most recently, in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos8 9 the Court upheld Title VII's
exemption of religious employers from the provisions of the statute against
an establishment clause challenge. Justice White's majority opinion held that
the exemption was a valid accommodation of the interests of religious
institutions. The Court noted that the exemption, which was extended in
1971 from covering only religious activities to apply to all non-profit activities
of religious organizations, removed a significant burden from religious em-
ployers.9 The Court determined that the fact that only religious, rather than
all non-profit organizations are benefited by the exemption, did not violate
the establishment clause. Removal of a regulatory burden on religious insti-
tutions need not "come packaged with benefits to secular entities" to pass
constitutional muster as a permissible accommodation. 91
Apparently, the Supreme Court is wary of requiring private employers
under Title VII to adjust their practices to the religious beliefs of their
employees. At the same time, however, government may validly exempt
religious employers from compliance with Title VII requirements. In areas
involving sabbatarian or other religious motivations for ceasing work, the
Court repeatedly has held that the free exercise clause protects the right of
individuals to claim unemployment insurance from the state.92
In the two most recent unemployment insurance cases, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued in dissents that the state should not be required to accom-
modate such religious choices, but instead should be allowed to do so
voluntarily.93 Maintaining that both the establishment and free exercise
clauses have been read too broadly, he is persuaded that: "[wihere, as here,
a State has enacted a general statute, the purpose and effect of which is to
advance the State's secular goals, the Free Exercise Clause does not in my
view require the State to conform that statute to the dictates of religious
conscience of any group." ' 94 "Conversely, governmental assistance which
does not have the effect of 'inducing' religious belief, but instead merely
'accommodates' or implements an independent religious choice does not
impermissibly involve the government in religious choices and therefore does
not violate the Establishment Clause . . ."9 From his viewpoint, the
primary cause of the tension between the clauses is an erroneously expansive
reading of the clauses, rather than an inherent conflict contained within
them. Exemptions would be virtually nonexistent under the jurisprudence
89. 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
90. Id. at 2868.
91. Id. at 2869.
92. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
93. Hobbie, 107 S. Ct. at 1052 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 723
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 723 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 727.
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espoused by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 96 The establishment clause would be
reduced to a prohibition only of direct inducement of belief. Accommoda-
tion, therefore, would be the rule rather than the exception, and apparent
conflict between the clauses would disappear.
A number of legal scholars, most notably Professor McConnell of the
University of Chicago, have proposed a similar approach. McConnell con-
tends that an accommodation of religion that promotes "religious liberty"
should be upheld.97 Moreover, he argues that government should be permitted
to remove socially-imposed burdens as well as governmentally-imposed bur-
dens, and proposes a three-step analysis to distinguish between permissible
accommodations and unwarranted benefits. 98 The primary question in ana-
lyzing a challenged accommodation of religion, according to McConnell, is
whether the action accommodates an independently adopted religion, or
whether the action induces religious belief in ways that further state inter-
ests. 99 Second, McConnell asks whether the accommodation interferes with
the religious rights of others.100 Finally, he would reject an accommodation
that preferred one religious sect over another. 0 1 Some commentators have
acknowledged that such an expansion of accommodation would substantially
weaken the free exercise clause as well as the establishment clause. They
96. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Sherbert, argued essentially the same point:
It has been suggested that ... singling out of religious conduct for special
treatment may violate the constitutional limitations on state action .... My own
view, however, is that at least under the circumstances of this case it would be a
permissible accommodation of religion for the State, if it chose to do so, to create
an exception to its eligibility requirements for persons like appellant ...
.... [Hlowever, I cannot subscribe to the conclusion that the State is constitu-
tionally compelled to carve out an exception to its general rule of eligibility in the
present case. Those situations in which the Constitution may require special treat-
ment on account of religion are, in my view, few and far between ....
374 U.S. at 422-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
97. McConnell, supra note 8, at 34-35 ("The essential distinction [for constitutional analysis]
is between permissible accommodations, which facilitate religious liberty, and unwarranted
benefits, which constrain religious choice.").
98. McConnell states:
Just as the government pursues "equal protection values" when it enacts laws
prohibiting racial discrimination in private markets, so also it pursues "free exercise
values" when it facilitates religious liberty in society at large. The "state action"
limitation on constitutional rights does not logically imply any limit on government's
power to extend statutory rights under its power to regulate commerce.
Id. at 32.
This approach, we believe, would unduly weaken the establishment clause. Virtually "[a]ny
statute pertaining to religion can be viewed as an 'accommodation' of free exercise rights."
Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2874 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 82 (1985)). Further, unlike the equal protection analogy drawn by Professor McConnell,
the free exercise clause is limited directly by its companion provision, the establishment clause.
No such limitation circumscribes the advancement of "equal protection values."
99. McConnell, supra note 8, at 35.
100. Id. at 37.
101. Id. at 39.
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argue that only if both clauses are curtailed sharply from current levels of
enforcement can the government operate efficiently. 10
We believe that such an approach goes too far. The history of the
enactment of the religion clauses shows a concern for civil as well as religious
liberties. 03 Although the clauses must be read with sufficient restraint to
avoid unnecessary conflict between the two, the spirit of the first amendment
demands continued vigilance to protect the religious and civil liberties of all
citizens. 104 It is this principle of protection of religious and civil liberties,
tempered by a due regard for the conviction of the Framers that they were
designing a cohesive program for religious liberty, that should inform our
interpretation of the theory of accommodation.
102. E.g., Oaks, supra note 8, at 4 ("[A]ccommodation represents a relaxation of both the
non-establishment and free exercise commands of the religion clause.").
103. As Mark DeWolfe Howe and others have pointed out, the Supreme Court jurisprudence
of the 1940's and 1950's inaccurately emphasized the "Jeffersonian" model of the religion
clauses, overlooking completely the substantial influence of evangelical Protestantism in the
enactment of the clauses. M. HowE, supra note 2, at 1-36; Mead supra note 2, at 165-70.
Cases, such as Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), which, relying on a phrase first
used by Jefferson, held that "[tIhe First Amendment has erected a wall between church and
state," id. at 18, stressed that "[tlhe structure of our government has, for the preservation of
civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference." Id. at 15 (quoting
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 750 (1871)). As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his
dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), exclusive
reliance on the anti-clerical political philosophies of Thomas Jefferson, or even James Madison,
may be misplaced. Perhaps because "American Protestantism has never developed any full-
blown theoretical justification for its [advocacy of disestablishment]," S. MEAD, THE LIVELY
EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 55-56 (1963), the rationalist justification
for disestablishment long dominated Supreme Court analysis.
The recent scholarly and judicial focus on the religious motivation for disestablishment-the
protection of "the garden in the wilderness" -has corrected much of the earlier gap in historical
analysis. If anything, the pendulum now has swung too far in the other direction: the Supreme
Court seems almost unwilling to concede any rationalist component of the religion clauses. In
fact, the religion clauses were produced by a temporary union of rationalists and pietists, both
of whom, despite fundamentally different reasons for doing so, agreed that religion is a matter
of individual conscience, not properly subject to governmental interference or support. The
union was not of long duration, however, primarily because disestablishment and free exercise
protection removed the only reason for unification.
Thus, while it would be a mistake to emphasize the rationalist element at the expense of the
evangelical influence, it is also incorrect to argue that the protection of religious liberty was
the only motive for the enactment of the clauses. The rationalists were profoundly concerned
that civil liberties be shielded from potential erosion by established religion.
104. As Justice O'Connor noted recently:
Even if the Founding Fathers did not live in a society with the "broad range of
benefits [and] complex programs" that the Federal Government administers today,
... they constructed a society in which the Constitution placed express limits upon
governmental actions limiting the freedoms of that society's members. The rise of
the welfare state was not the fall of the Free Exercise Clause.
Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. Ct. 2147, 2169 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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IV. THE ROLE OF ACCOMMODATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
Of primary importance in any examination of the concept of accommo-
dation is the recognition that the zone of permissible accommodation oc-
cupies the area between the two clauses. Accommodation thus touches both
the establishment prohibition and the free exercise guarantee, without vio-
lating either. This recognition is a vital one, in that a valid accommodation,
while it is not required by the free exercise clause, is nonetheless related to
free exercise interests. Former Chief Justice Burger, after pointing out in
Walz that accommodation is not limited by free exercise,105 stopped short
of providing any guidelines for determining the relationship between accom-
modation and free exercise.
In an insightful concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree, °6 Justice O'Connor
stated that the conflict between the religion clauses should be mediated
through a properly defined accommodation doctrine. She further pointed
out that the establishment and free exercise clauses are addressed to govern-
mental action, rather than social or other non-governmental forces. Given
this concern with state action, government validly may implement free
exercise values by removing a governmentally-imposed burden on religion.
A statute exempting religious individuals from an otherwise burdensome
regulation, therefore, should be recognized as fulfilling the spirit of the free
exercise clause and should not be held to abridge the establishment clause. 0 7
The solution to the conflict between the religion clauses lies not in "neu-
trality," but rather in identifying workable limits to the Government's
license to promote the free exercise of religion. The text of the free exercise
clause speaks of laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion. On its
face, the clause is directed at government interference with free exercise.
Given that concern, one can plausibly assert that government pursues free
exercise clause values when it lifts a governmentally-imposed burden on
the free exercise of religion. If a statute falls within this category, then
the standard establishment clause test should be modified accordingly. 08
Herein lies Justice O'Connor's resolution of the tension between the two
clauses: If government voluntarily removes a burden it has placed on religion,
that removal does not automatically violate the establishment clause. Thus,
some accommodations are constitutional, but only those that remove gov-
ernmentally-imposed burdens on religion.
This approach is consistent with earlier Supreme Court statements about
accommodation. For example, in Walz the Court stressed that the state tax
exemption of religious properties was not an unconstitutional establishment
of religion, because the exemption removed a governmentally-imposed bur-
den on religious institutions, rather than conferring a benefit. "We cannot
105. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S* 664, 673 (1970).
106. 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
107. Id. See also supra note 90, for an analysis of McConnell's critique of this limitation.
108. 472 U.S. at 84.
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read New York's statute as attempting to establish religion; it is simply
sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation levied
on private profit institutions."'0
This accommodation analysis applies to the removal of burdens on religious
exercise when the free exercise clause does not mandate granting an exception
or invalidating a regulation. Thus, the doctrine of accommodation permits
affirmative governmental actions to lessen a burden on a religious interest.
The next question must be what comprises such a religious interest. In
exploring the contours of the doctrine, we propose that a burden on a
religious interest exists when government has required compliance with a
regulation which offends the religious sensibilities of individuals or institu-
tions, but which would not trigger a constitutional right to relief under the
free exercise clause. If there is a compelling state interest in the regulation,
or if the religious interest is so remote and tangential that the action does
not rise to the level of an infringement, the free exercise clause does not
mandate that government accommodate the belief. When government vol-
untarily chooses to alter its requirements to comport with such a religious
interest, however, the accommodation would not violate the establishment
clause. This broad definition of permissible accommodation is somewhat
complex, but two examples may clarify its application.
An illustration of a religious interest in an exemption, as opposed to a
free exercise right to exemption, is found in the draft cases involving con-
scientious objection to war. As the Supreme Court noted in Gillette v. United
States, it is generally accepted that the Constitution does not mandate
exemption from military service for conscientious objectors," 0 because one
of the most compelling state interests is that of government in protecting its
citizens and borders through military conscription. Although interpreting a
statute rather than applying a full constitutional analysis, the caselaw implies
that such an important interest in national security would outweigh individual
religious objections to war."' Thus, there would be no free exercise right to
exemption from the draft, because a compelling state interest justifies con-
scription. As Professor Giannella noted, the. compelling state interest argu-
ment is bolstered further by the fact that a proposal to include an exemption
for conscientious objectors was not adopted by the drafters of the first
amendment."12
Yet it is clear that some religious groups sincerely oppose all use of force,
even in self-defense. The religious interests of pacifists unquestionably are
burdened by the requirement that they participate in armed conflict. The
fact that the state has a compelling interest in its defense does not lessen
109. 397 U.S. at 673.
110. 401 U.S. 437, 461 n.23 (1971).
111. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 370 (1970) (White, J., dissenting)
("[Tihis Court has more than once stated its unwillingness to construe the First Amendment,
standing alone, as requiring draft exemptions for religious believers.").
112. Giannella, supra note 8, at 1411-12.
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the heavy burden borne by groups like the Quakers, whose commitment to
pacifism predates by more than a century the Revolution that created our
country." 3 An accommodation of such a clear religious interest would not
violate the establishment clause."14
A further example of voluntary accommodation in an area of compelling
state interests is presented by the late Judge Leventhal's thoughtful concur-
rence in Anderson v. Laird."5 In that case, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court struck down regulations at Army, Navy and Air Force academies that
required cadets to attend chapel on a weekly basis and prohibited them from
changing their religious affiliation without permission. Concurring in the
judgment, Judge Leventhal stressed that coerced worship undoubtedly vio-
lated basic constitutional principles, but, if the academies had made chapel
services available without compelling attendance, their actions would not
have transgressed the establishment clause. Judge Leventhal stated:
[Ilt is important to begin with the proposition which to me at least seems
clear, that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the Academies from
providing property, facilities, and personnel in order to permit chapel and
church attendance by cadets on a voluntary basis. In this voluntary context,
the scope of the Establishment Clause is affected by the special position
of the military and needs of its often isolated personnel, and such expen-
ditures do not constitute an "excessive entanglement" with religion."6
Despite the fact that provision of chapels and chaplains involves an expen-
diture of governmental funds, the financial support of religion would not
abridge the establishment clause because the academies in that event would
be recognizing the special needs of military personnel, who often are isolated
or restricted in their movements. In such situations, the availability of
religious worship or spiritual counseling would accommodate beliefs that
otherwise would be burdened by the exigencies of military service." 7
113. William Penn, in his essay "For of Light Came Sight," offered the following explanation
of Quaker pacificism:
Not fighting, but suffering is another testimony peculiar to [Quakers]. They
affirm that Christianity teacheth people to beat their swords into plough-shares,
and their spears into pruning hooks, and to learn war no more, that so the wolf
may lie down with the lamb and the lion with the calf, and nothing that destroys
be entertained in the hearts of people ....
Reprinted in THE QUAKER READER 106, 109 (J. West ed. 1962). See also E. RUSSELL, THE
HISTORY OF QUAKERiSM 46-58, 165-182 (1942).
114. Justice White seems to agree with this analysis of the conscientious objector cases. In
a dissent in Welsh, he argued that Congress should be allowed to determine whether it would
voluntarily exempt religious pacifists. Such an exception, he maintained, would not violate the
establishment clause. 398 U.S. at 370-71.
115. 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom., Laird v. Anderson, 409 U.S.
1076 (1972).
116. Id. at 298 (Leventhal, J., concurring). For a thoughtful analysis of the constitutionality
of the military chaplaincy as it is currently structured, see Note, Military Mirrors on the Wall:
Nonestablishment and the Military Chaplaincy, 95 YALE L.J. 1210 (1986).
117. Id.
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The recent decision Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos"8 made this approach even
clearer. That case involved an establishment clause challenge to the con-
gressional exemption of religious employers from Title VII's equal employ-
ment opportunity requirements. The Court upheld the statutory
accommodation of the interests of religious institutions. Rejecting the ar-
gument that the exemption violates the establishment clause because it applies
only to the religious activities of religious employers, rather than to a broad
class of secular and religious non-profit activity, the Court held that "[w]here,
as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that
burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the
exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities.""' 9 Thus, when
government removes a regulatory-rather than a social or other non-govern-
mentally-imposed-burden on a religious interest, even if the free exercise
clause would not require an exemption, such a removal is a valid accom-
modation, and the establishment clause does not invalidate the action.
Religious employers would not have a free exercise right to exemption, given
the compelling interests served by Title VII. On the other hand, there can
be no doubt that imposition of Title VII requirements on religious employers
would impose a burden on their religious beliefs and practices. In such a
situation, the establishment clause permits accommodation, although the free
exercise clause does not mandate an exemption.
A third example of this first prong of our proposed test is found in United
States v. Lee. 20 In that case, the Court found that the federal government's
interest in uniform and predictable collection of Social Security taxes out-
weighed an Amish employer's religious objection to payment of the taxes.' 2 '
Although not explicitly addressed by the Court, it is likely that a congres-
sionally-enacted exemption for employers like Lee would be constitutional,
given that there is a burden imposed on the Amish employer by the man-
datory tax payment. The free exercise clause, while certainly relevant to the
burden, does not provide a means of relief, because of the compelling interest
in uniformity. Congress could, however, decide on its own that the value of
accommodating religious dissenters outweighs its own interest in uniform
collection.
The second broad category of permissible accommodations is illustrated
by the Supreme Court's decision in Bowen v. Roy. 12 In Bowen, the Supreme
Court upheld the regulation that a dependent recipient of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children must have a social security number. The plaintiff,
a Native American, claimed that his beliefs would be violated if his daughter's
social security number was used by the government in its processing of
118. 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987).
119. Id. at 2869.
120. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
121. 455 U.S. at 258-59.
122. 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986).
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benefits. The plaintiff believed that the use of the social security number
might impair his daughter's spirit. The Court recognized that the plaintiff's
beliefs were sincere and could conceivably be affected adversely by the
regulation. However, it concluded that the free exercise clause did not require
an exemption, because the internal governmental procedures affected the
plaintiff's religious beliefs only marginally. According to Roy, a plaintiff
may not invoke the protection of the free exercise clause if governmental
activity is exclusively internal, only incidentally affecting the interests of
individual citizens. In other words, a religious individual does not have a
free exercise right to restructure internal governmental procedures to conform
with his or her religious beliefs. The infringement was de minimis, and
mandatory adjustment of auditing mechanisms could well have imposed
substantial costs. 1 23
Thus, despite the plaintiff's genuine religious interest, he could not demand
an exemption from the regulation, since to do so would require the govern-
ment to restructure its own auditing mechanisms. The incidental effect of
the requirement was a potential burden on a religious interest. Because the
government's use of a social security number already in its possession affected
religious exercise only tangentially, however, the burden was held to be only
incidental and could be justified by the state's substantial interest in pre-
venting fraud and administering benefits. 124 As in the draft and Title VII
cases, voluntary exception from the social security number requirement to
accommodate the plaintiff's beliefs would not violate the non-establishment
mandate, since the burden on the belief was imposed by the regulation.
Most recently, the holding of Bowen v. Roy was extended to apply to a
claim that proposed governmental development of public lands would destroy
the practice of the site-specific religion of several local Native American
tribes. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,15
123. Id. at 2155-56.
124. The case was a confusing one procedurally. The plaintiff, who argued originally that
providing a social security number for his daughter would violate his religious beliefs, changed
his position when it was revealed at the final day of trial that the government already possessed
a social security number for the daughter, and had been using it in processing benefits for the
plaintiff. After this revelation, the plaintiff changed his complaint to reflect a belief that the
government's use of an already existing social security number would violate his beliefs. Justice
Stevens believed that the case had been mooted by the discovery of the number's existence, but
that, even if it was not moot, the case was not ripe, given that the trial had been based on the
erroneous belief that no social security number had yet been obtained for the plaintiff's daughter.
106 S. Ct. at 2163-64 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, maintained that there is a crucial difference between prohibiting government from using
in a neutral and impartial way information already in its possession, and requiring a potential
recipient to supply a social security number prior to receiving benefits. In the latter situation
the traditional compelling state interest-least restrictive means test should be triggered, because
in that situation government would be conditioning receipt of a benefit upon an infringement
of free exercise rights. 106 S. Ct. at 2165 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
125. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
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Justice O'Connor, writing for a 5-3 majority, held that the government need
not demonstrate a compelling interest in the construction of a logging road,
despite the fact that "the logging and road-building projects at issue in this
case could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious prac-
tices."126 The majority rejected the argument of the dissent that federal land-
use decisions, unlike the internal recordkeeping processes at issue in Roy,
have "substantial external effects,' '1 27 and have the potential "to destroy an
entire religion.' ' 2 The Court did stress, however, that a voluntary decision
to forego construction in the area sacred to the local tribes would be a valid
accommodation of what are indisputably vital religious interests: "Nothing
in our opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the
religious needs of any citizen. The Government's rights to the use of its own
land, for example, need not and should not discourage it from accommo-
dating religious practices like those engaged in by the Indian respondents.' ' 29
Lyng is reminiscent of Braunfeld v. Brown. 130 In that case, the Supreme
Court denied an orthodox Jewish merchant's claim that Sunday closing laws
had violated his free exercise rights. The plaintiff maintained that the Sunday
closing law put him at an unfair competitive disadvantage because he was
required by his religious beliefs to keep his store closed on Saturday. Non-
Jewish store owners captured much of his business on Saturday, and he was
denied the opportunity to recoup his losses by staying open on Sunday.
The Court rejected this argument, holding that the state's interest in a
uniform day of rest, the difficulty of administering exceptions, and a poten-
tial windfall for the exempted class all outweighed the economic burden
borne by the plaintiff.' The Court intimated, however, that a state could
exempt non-Sunday sabbatarian businesses from its Sunday closing laws
without offending the establishment clause. 32 Later, the state of Kentucky
did just that, and an appeal from the decision upholding the exemption was
dismissed by the Supreme Court "for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion.""'33
Although we would maintain that the free exercise clause analysis may
well have been improperly denied applicability to Mr. Braunfeld's situation, 14
it is apparent that Kentucky's voluntary accommodation of such sabbatarian
religious interests was constitutionally valid. Similarly, although we believe
that the government should have been required to meet the standard com-
126. 108 S. Ct. at 1326.
127. Id. at 1336.
128. Id. at 1339.
129. Id. at 1328.
130. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
131. Id. at 608-09.
132. Id. at 608.
133. Arlan's Dept. Store, Inc. v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962).
134. But cf. Note, New York Get Statute, supra note 8, at 1153-58 (arguing Braunfeld was
correctly decided).
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pelling state interest test for infringements of religious freedom in Lyng, it
is unquestionable that a decision to accommodate the Native American
religious interests would be constitutional.
In situations involving an exemption from a governmental burden, the
threat of an establishment of religion is remote, precisely because government
has acted to remove a burden placed on religion by one of its own regulations.
That removal does not constitute a promotion or endorsement of religion.
Significantly, an accommodation of a religious claim that was not designed
to lift a governmentally-imposed burden would run a far higher risk of
abridging the establishment clause. For example, a decision to turn over
public lands to a religious group that wanted to build a church would be an
impermissible establishment. This action results in a violation of the estab-
lishment clause because government would be conferring a benefit on the
religion, rather than removing a disability.'"
A final example highlights the importance of limiting accommodation to
relieving burdens imposed by government, rather than burdens placed on
religions by society at large. Government may have an interest in regulating
when and where religious activity takes place. It may not, however, remove
burdens imposed by the rough and tumble of society. If a particular religion,
such as a group that believes in soliciting door-to-door and using aggressive
and persistent proselytizing practices, provokes ridicule or peaceful demon-
strations against such practices, it would be invalid for the state to seek to
alleviate such a socially-imposed burden.'3 6 Quite apart from the free speech
rights of demonstrators, the state may not interfere in independent religious
or anti-religious choices that do not otherwise violate the law. Government,
of course, could protect the group against violence or physical interference,
but it could not undertake to ensure that group members would be immune
from the indignities of demonstrations that express opposition to the group's
beliefs. If the state were to remove a burden imposed by social forces, it
would, in effect, be sponsoring that religion, thereby trespassing on the non-
establishment mandate.
135. Although the case ultimately was decided on standing grounds rather than on the merits,
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 (1982), involved taxpayers' establishment clause challenge to the federal govern-
ment's transfer of a former military hospital to a sectarian college. In essence, plaintiffs alleged
.that the government had given a substantial property award to one denomination, much like
the hypothetical we use to illustrate an impermissible accommodation.
136. A series of landmark first amendment decisions, apparently based primarily on the
speech clause rather than the free exercise clause, involved proselytizing activities similar to
those described in the text. At issue in those cases was the judicial protection of the rights of
the proselytizers themselves, rather than those of counter-demonstrators. See, e.g. Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing conviction for breach of peace based on record
played by Jehovah's Witness); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating anti-littering
ordinance used to convict Jehovah's Witnesses who had distributed religious leaflets); Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (invalidating municipal statute prohibiting distribution of
literature without permit after Jehovah's Witness was convicted of violating ordinance while
distributing religious literature).
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In short, because the free exercise and establishment clauses are directed
expressly at governmental action, the doctrine of accommodation, which
exists in the interstices of the two clauses, must also be tied closely to
governmental action. By restricting accommodation to instances of alleviating
a burden imposed by government, the danger of vitiating the establishment
clause is avoided. By limiting the doctrine of accommodation to cases in
which a religious interest rather than a free exercise right is presented, the
danger of reducing the free exercise clause to a matter of voluntary compli-
ance is also avoided.
V. CONCLUSION
Accommodation is by its very nature a theory of the middle ground. By
confining accommodation to the area between establishment and free exer-
cise, the vitality of both clauses is maintained, and much of the tension that
has grown up between them is thereby diminished. The test proposed here,
while it may not resolve all issues of accommodation, provides broad guide-
lines for judges, legislators, and religious groups that must deal with gov-
ernmental burdens on individual believers.

